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NOTE:
Federal Ignorance and the Battle for
Supervised Injection Sites
BEN LONGNECKER*
From 1999 to 2017, over 400,000 people have died from
opioid overdoses. The federal government recognizes the
opioid epidemic as a crisis, yet it has failed to slow the surge
of overdose deaths. Some states are, therefore, looking at the
implementation of supervised injection sites. There are over
100 supervised injection sites around the world in twelve different countries, and these sites have produced hopeful data
on counteracting the opioid crisis’s negative societal effects.
However, the federal government has seemingly ignored any
empirical evidence and continues to threaten state-sponsored supervised injection sites with criminal prosecution.
This Note argues that any federal challenge to these supervised injection sites should be unsuccessful and will also dispel federal authorities’ conclusory allegations that these
sites do not practically combat the harms of the opioid crisis.
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On May 5, 2017, Joseph “Blake” Hadden was found dead in his
apartment.1 He was hours away from walking across a stage to receive his diploma from Furman University in Greenville, South Carolina.2 Blake died from an overdose of an opioid-based substance
named fentanyl, a drug thirty times more deadly than heroin.3 Blake
was among the 70,000 estimated deaths due to drug overdose in

1

Angelia Davis & Anna Lee, Furman Student Died from Fentanyl Overdose, STATE (June 17, 2017, 9:53 PM), https://www.thestate.com/news/state/
south-carolina/article156811924.html.
2
Id.
3
Id.
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2017.4 Around 30,000 of those overdoses can be attributed to fentanyl and similar synthetic opioids.5 That is eighty-one overdoses each
day, a forty-five percent increase in fentanyl-related deaths compared to 2016.6 In comparison, twice as many people died from fentanyl in 2017 than from murders and non-negligent homicides7—
enough for the entire undergraduate student population of Furman
University (Blake Hadden’s would-be alma mater) to fatally overdose ten times.8
This Note will address the debate over establishing supervised
injection sites in the United States to combat the opioid crisis—
which the federal government has labeled a “public health emergency.”9 Though the problems associated with the opioid crisis extend beyond potential solutions like supervised injection sites, the
results of injection sites abroad have been unequivocally successful
in reducing overdoses, blood-borne diseases, and referring marginalized populations to drug treatment services.10 This Note argues
that these supervised injection sites are practical solutions based on
empirical evidence from around the world11 and dispels federal authorities’ conclusory allegations that these sites are “dangerous.” 12
In addition, this Note criticizes the simplistic approach other
Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates (last updated Jan.
2019).
5
Id.
6
Josh Katz & Margot Sanger-Katz, ‘The Numbers Are So Staggering.’
Overdose Deaths Set a Record Last Year., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/29/upshot/fentanyl-drug-overdose-deaths.html.
7
Total Number of Murders in the United States in 2017, by State, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/195331/number-of-murders-in-the-us-bystate/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).
8
Furman University: Facts, FURMAN U., https://www.furman.edu/
about/facts/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020) (listing undergraduate enrollment at 2,800
students).
9
Ending America’s Opioid Crisis, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse
.gov/opioids/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).
10
See infra notes 81–117.
11
See infra notes 81–117.
12
See, e.g., Rod J. Rosenstein, Opinion, Fight Drug Abuse, Don’t Subsidize
It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/opinion/
opioids-heroin-injection-sites.html.
4
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scholarly publications have taken when applying relevant Supreme
Court jurisprudence to answer this question: does the federal government overstep its authority by challenging the creation of supervised injection sites?
Part I briefly discusses the beginnings of the opioid crisis, the
current ineffective responses from the federal government, and the
need for innovative solutions like supervised injection sites. Part II
details how these supervised injection sites operate and examines
empirical evidence from existing supervised injection sites around
the world and in the United States. Part III describes the federal government’s position against supervised injection sites to lay a foundation for Part IV, which evaluates the “state versus federal” conflict
and how a future court may resolve the matter. This Note concludes
on an optimistic note. Supervised injection sites save lives and are
an effective response to the opioid crisis. These sites may have an
uphill battle when facing the federal government, but their existence
is hope for the United States as it attempts to stabilize the opioid
crisis.
I. A HISTORICAL AND MODERN ACCOUNT OF THE OPIOID CRISIS
While this Note primarily focuses on the legality of state-sponsored, supervised injection sites as a response to individuals who
inject dangerous opioids, a brief historical account of the opioid crisis is necessary to understand why opioid use became a public emergency—and why federal intervention has been ineffective.
A. The War on Drugs: A Primer
Modern federal anti-opioid policies have roots in the infamous
“War on Drugs.”13 In the 1960s, the federal government had a militant stance against illegal drug use based on a simple assumption:
drugs are dangerous and linked to violent crime.14 The Nixon administration coined the phrase “War on Drugs,” after passing the
Controlled Substances Act.15 This act gave law enforcement more
Ti’a Latice Hazel, Who Can Handle Marijuana the Best? The States’ Failure to Regulate Marijuana and the Federal Government’s Sole Power to Regulate
Marijuana, 11 CHARLESTON L. REV. 495, 498 (2017).
14
Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 233 (2015).
15
See Hazel, supra note 13, at 498.
13
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power to combat illegal drug use, primarily through incarceration.16
In addition, the Controlled Substances Act also recognized the need
for a long-term federal drug policy that encompassed the creation of
effective health programs to minimize the harms of drug abuse.17
The “War on Drugs” has continued to this day, and scholars have
critiqued federal drug policy for being applied in a racially disproportionate manner,18 failing to reduce the use of illegal drugs,19 and
further exacerbating the dangers associated with illegal drug use.20
However, federal authorities claim that the Department of Justice’s
aggressive stance against illegal drug use is delivering “results” 21
and adamantly oppose the creation of supervised injection sites as
an innovative solution to confront drug abuse.22 But, as explained
below, the current federal drug policies have not meaningfully impacted the surge of citizens who abuse opioids.23
B. Opioids Explained, and the Rise of the Opioid Crisis
Opioid abuse is a relatively new crisis that began in the 1990s.24
Pharmaceutical companies facilitated a new era of treating pain

16

Id. at 498–500.
21 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
18
Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences
of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 262 (2002).
19
See Baradaran, supra note 14, at 232.
20
Scott Burris et al., Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local Innovation in
Public Health: The Case of the Supervised Injection Facility, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1089, 1098 (2009).
21
Rosenstein, supra note 12. In terms of general “results,” the federal government has seized millions of pounds of drugs a year. Robert Longley, Statistics
from the War on Drugs Tell a Story, THOUGHTCO. (Jan. 14, 2018),
https://www.thoughtco.com/statistics-from-the-war-on-drugs-4083707.
However, prohibition of any drug—at its foundation—is too simplistic of an approach
to deter the use of harmful substances. See CHRISTOPHER J. COYNE & ABIGAIL R.
HALL, CATO INST., FOUR DECADES AND COUNTING: THE CONTINUED FAILURE OF
THE
WAR
ON
DRUGS
3–4
(2017),
https://www.cato.org/sites/
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-811-updated.pdf.
22
See Rosenstein, supra note 12.
23
See Robert Parker Tricarico, A Nation in the Throes of Addiction: Why A
National Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Is Needed Before It Is Too Late,
37 WHITTIER L. REV. 117, 118 (2016).
24
See infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
17
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management through the prescription of opioids, 25 a class of drug
naturally derived from or artificially produced to mimic the chemical structure of the opium poppy plant.26 Opioids work by activating
certain nerve receptors in the brain that trigger the same biochemical
brain processes that reward people with feelings of pleasure—leading doctors to prescribe them as pain relievers. 27 As someone routinely takes opioids, their nerve receptors become less responsive,
requiring increased dosages to produce pleasure comparable to previous drug-taking episodes.28 However, repeat exposure to escalating dosages alters the brain to function normally only if opioids are
in one’s system,29 which can lead to daily drug use to avert the unpleasant symptoms of drug withdrawal; further prolonged use may
permanently alter the part of the brain that enables compulsive drugseeking behavior.30 While modern science acknowledges that opioid
pain relievers are generally safe when taken for a short time, continued use has dangerous risks of developing the type of dependence
that could lead to overdoses and death.31
Though physicians have historically been concerned with longterm opioid treatment,32 this new era of opioids originated from a
seemingly innocuous correspondence published in the 1980 edition
of the New England Journal of Medicine.33 One paragraph of the
letter stated—with minimal statistical evidence, citing only a single
study of approximately 11,000 people—that “despite widespread
use of narcotic drugs in hospitals, the development of addiction is

Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis (last updated Feb. 2020).
26
Prescription Opioids: What are Prescription Opioids?, NAT’L INST. ON
DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/prescriptionopioids (last updated June 2019).
27
Thomas R. Kosten & Tony P. George, The Neurobiology of Opioid Dependence: Implications for Treatment, SCI. & PRAC. PERSP., July 2002, at 13, 14.
28
Id. at 15.
29
Id. at 14.
30
Id. at 15.
31
Opioids: Brief Description, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).
32
Jack Hubbard et al., Opioid Abuse: The Fall of A Prince, 21 QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L.J. 159, 167 (2018).
33
Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial
Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 223 (2009).
25
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rare in medical patients with no history of addiction.”34 Subsequently, this correspondence was cited in over 400 medical papers
to support the idea that addiction is not likely to occur in patients
treated with opioids.35
Pharmaceutical companies, such as Purdue Pharma, used this
letter to aggressively market opioids and trained their sales representatives to falsify that the addiction risk of pain-relieving opioids
was “less than one percent.”36 This misrepresentation was brought
to light in 2007, when several executives at an affiliate of Purdue
Pharma pled guilty to criminal charges of misrepresenting the harmful effects of opioid addiction and were forced to pay over $600 million in fines.37 By that time, however, many physicians had become
comfortable prescribing opioids for patients that suffered from acute
and chronic pain, marking the beginning of the modern-day opioid
crisis.38
Scholars note two additional factors that may have contributed
to the opioid crisis. The first occurred in 2001 when the Joint Commission—a non-profit organization that accredits over 22,000 health
care organizations and programs in the United States39—established
Pain Management Standards that classified pain as a “fifth vital
sign.”40 This new mandate required that health care providers ask
every patient about their relative pain levels.41 Advocates have since
argued that this pain standard led physicians to conclude that pain
was being undertreated and resulted in increased issuance of opioids
34

Jane Porter & Hershel Jick, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with Narcotics, 302 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 123, 123 (1980).
35
Hubbard et al., supra note 32, at 167.
36
Purdue Pharma also relied upon a separate study on the treatment of burn
units to rationalize their advocacy for the widespread use of opioids to treat pain—
though this study also lacked detailed statistical evidence. See Van Zee, supra
note 33, at 223.
37
Id.
38
Hubbard et al., supra note 32, at 168.
39
Facts About the Joint Commission, JOINT COMMISSION, https://www.jointcommission.org/about-us/facts-about-the-joint-commission/ (last visited Mar. 8,
2020).
40
Kristina Fiore, Opioid Crisis: Scrap Pain as 5th Vital Sign?, MEDPAGE
TODAY (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.medpagetoday.com/publichealthpolicy/
publichealth/57336.
41
Id.
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to patients.42 Further, some scholars note that a recent shift towards
patient-centric care had the unintended consequence of increased
opioid prescriptions.43 The argument is that patients dealing with
acute or chronic pain have come to expect opioid prescriptions, and
those doctors who do not fulfill that expectation are given poor satisfaction ratings.44 Because these satisfaction ratings may be correlated to the salary or retention of a physician, a doctor may feel incentivized to dispense opioids to meet patient expectations.45
As a result, the amount of opioid-based prescriptions exploded.46
From 1997 to 2002, the United States saw a 226% increase in the
prescription rate of fentanyl, 73% increase in the rate of morphine,
and 402% increase in oxycodone.47 By 2005, opioids ranked second
only to marijuana in terms of illegal drug use. 48 The total sales of
opioid pain relievers quadrupled from 1999 to 2008—alongside a
corresponding quadrupling of the overdose death rate and a sixfold
increase of the substance abuse treatment rate.49
C. The Modern Crisis and Ineffective Governmental Response
Though Congress recognized the 2000s as the “Decade of Pain
Control,” the federal government has largely been ineffective and
slow to respond to this nationwide crisis.50 In 2008, the Food and
Drug Administration concluded that opioids should remain a Schedule III drug,51 which is defined as a substance or chemical with a

42

Hubbard et al., supra note 32, at 168.
Aleksandra Zgierska, Michael Miller & David Rabago, Patient Satisfaction, Prescription Drug Abuse, and Potential Unintended Consequences, 307 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 1377, 1378 (2012).
44
Id. at 1377.
45
Id. at 1378.
46
Van Zee, supra note 33, at 224.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Vital Signs: Overdoses of Prescription Opioid
Pain Relievers — United States, 1999–2008, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 1487, 1488 (2011).
50
Tricarico, supra note 23, at 118.
51
Barry Meier & Eric Lipton, F.D.A. Shift on Painkillers Was Years in the
Making, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/
10/28/business/fda-shift-on-painkillers-was-years-in-the-making.html?_r=0&
pagewanted=all&pagewanted=print. Notably, the federal government reclassified
43
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moderate to low potential for physical and psychological dependence.52 Opioid misuse and overdoses continued to rise, and in 2011,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) released a
report stating that opioid overdoses had reached “epidemic levels.”53
That same year, the federal government responded, and the Office
of National Drug Control Policy released a strategic plan to reduce
opioid drug abuse.54 This plan included expanding federal intervention into four major areas: education, tracking and monitoring,
proper medication disposal, and law enforcement.55 Despite this federal action, overdose deaths from opioids have continued to rise.56
Between 2010 and 2017, the rate of heroin-related overdose deaths
has increased by nearly 400%.57 In addition, overdose deaths from
synthetic opioids nearly doubled between 2013 and 2014, 58 and they
doubled again between the years 2015 to 2016.59
dangerous opioids as a Schedule II drug in 2013 to allow for stricter regulation.
See Tricarico, supra note 23, at 125.
52
Drug Scheduling and Penalties, CAMPUS DRUG PREVENTION,
https://www.campusdrugprevention.gov/content/drug-scheduling-and-penalties
(last visited Mar. 8, 2020).
53
Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Prescription Painkiller Overdoses at Epidemic Levels (Nov. 1, 2011), https://www.cdc.gov/
media/releases/2011/p1101_flu_pain_killer_overdose.htm.
54
See Office of National Drug Control Policy: Prescription Drug Abuse,
OBAMA
WHITE
HOUSE,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ondcp/
prescription-drug-abuse1 (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).
55
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., EPIDEMIC: RESPONDING TO
AMERICA’S
PRESCRIPTION
DRUG
ABUSE
CRISIS
(2011),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp/rx_abuse_plan.pdf.
56
Opioid Overdose: Understanding the Epidemic, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/
index.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Understanding the Epidemic].
57
Opioid Overdose: Heroin, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/heroin.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2018).
58
Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths —
United States, 2000–2014, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1378, 1379
(2016) (data not including overdoses from methadone).
59
HOLLY HEDEGAARD ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DRUG
OVERDOSE DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2016, at 1 (2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db294.pdf (data not including overdoses from methadone).
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D. Injection Drug Users and an Introduction of the Need for
Supervised Injection Sites
Though a significant number of the 400,000 total opioid overdoses from 1999 to 2017 resulted from the misuse of prescription
opioids,60 a corresponding increase in injection-based opioid users
is now apparent.61 The CDC estimates that between 2004 and 2014,
there has been a 93% increase in admissions to substance use disorder treatment facilitates for injection-based opioids.62 Other studies
indicate that an estimated 10% to 20% of people who abuse prescription opioids move to injection-based opioids.63 These injection
drug users are at a high risk of acquiring blood borne illnesses such
as Hepatitis C or human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”).64 Consequently, the CDC observed a 133% increase in the spread of Hepatitis C infections between 2004 and 2014.65 In addition, anxiety
about social rejection and arrest deter the use of health and preventative services, forcing injection drug users into hidden locations
that are poorly suited for hygienic injection and which make the users more likely to contract a blood borne disease.66 Needle-syringe
exchange programs and increased access to drug treatment programs
60

See Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 56.
Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Increase in Hepatitis C Infections Linked to Worsening Opioid Crisis (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/2017/hepatitis-c-and-opioid-injectionpress-release.html.
62
Id.
63
Lindsey Dawson & Jennifer Kates, HIV and the Opioid Epidemic: 5 Key
Points, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.kff.org/
hivaids/issue-brief/hiv-and-the-opioid-epidemic-5-key-points/; Alia A. Al-Tayyib, Stephen Koester & Paula Riggs, Prescription Opioids Prior to Injection Drug
Use: Comparisons and Public Health Implications, 65 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS
224, 225 (2016).
64
Burris et al., supra note 20, at 1096.
65
Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Increase in Hepatitis C Infections Linked to Worsening Opioid Crisis (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/2017/hepatitis-c-and-opioid-injectionpress-release.html.
66
Beletsky et al., The Law (and Politics) of Safe Injection Facilities in the
United States, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 231, 231 (2008). Shooting galleries are
described as “structures such as homes—privately owned, abandoned, and otherwise—that are frequented by [injection drug users] for the purpose of injecting.”
Id.
61
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have ameliorated some of these risks,67 but they do not address the
lack of a supervised and hygienic setting for injection68—nor the
fear of legal consequences that witnesses and drug users face when
confronting a potentially deadly overdose.69
Many different countries have therefore turned to an innovative
solution: supervised injection sites.70 There are over one hundred
supervised injection sites around the world that were created to address unsupervised drug consumption.71 The theory is straightforward: allow people who are determined to consume pre-obtained
drugs to use the drugs, but under the supervision of trained staff who
can reduce the health risks often associated with public drug consumption.72 Additionally, these sites “provide counseling and referrals to vital social services and treatment options.”73 Though these
supervised injection sites are widely recognized as successful
abroad,74 the creation of supervised injection sites in the United
States remains highly controversial.75
67
Syringe Services Programs (SSPs), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ssp/index.html (last updated May 23, 2019).
68
See Syringe Services Programs (SSPs) FAQs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ssp/syringe-services-programsfaq.html (last updated May 23, 2019) (explaining that, while needle exchanges
offer resources like Naloxone and sterile syringes to users, the programs do not
provide sterile, safe locations to inject drugs).
69
See Melissa Tracy et al., Circumstances of Witnessed Drug Overdose in
New York City: Implications for Intervention, 79 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE
181, 183 (2005).
70
See infra notes 81–109 and accompanying text.
71
Supervised Consumption Services, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE,
http://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/supervised-consumption-services (last visited
Mar. 9, 2020).
72
See id.
73
Jessica Cohen, Supervised Injection Facilities Face Obstacles, But That
Shouldn’t Stop Them, HEALTH AFF. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20181127.121405/full/.
74
See, e.g., EUROPEAN MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION,
DRUG CONSUMPTION ROOMS: AN OVERVIEW OF PROVISION AND EVIDENCE
(2018),
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/2734/POD
_Drug%20consumption%20rooms.pdf [hereinafter DRUG CONSUMPTION
ROOMS].
75
See Elana Gordon, What’s the Evidence that Supervised Drug Injection
Sites
Save
Lives?,
NPR
(Sept.
7,
2018,
2:40
PM),
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II. HOW SUPERVISED INJECTION SITES OPERATE AND EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE
A. A Look Inside a Supervised Injection Site
As mentioned above, a supervised injection site is a facility
where injection drug users may inject drugs that are obtained elsewhere while under the supervision of healthcare providers who are
well-equipped to administer Naloxone—the overdose antidote for
opioids—if necessary.76 Legislation creating supervised injection
sites does not legalize or encourage use of opioids.77 It simply gives
high-risk, vulnerable populations a sterile place to inject the drugs—
as opposed to using a nonsterile environment.78 More significantly,
supervised injection sites aim to connect and refer those socially
marginalized populations to treatment and rehabilitation services.79
Medical professionals do not assist with any injections or handle any
drugs, but instead they offer general medical advice and recommendations on how to prevent the spread of blood-borne diseases.80
B. The Empirical Evidence
Approximately 120 legal supervised injection sites currently operate across Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland.81 One
unsanctioned, research-based supervised injection site operated in
the United States from 2014 to 2016.82 The following Sections
briefly summarize some empirical data for these sites around the
world.

https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/09/07/645609248/whats-the-evidence-that-supervised-drug-injection-sites-save-lives.
76
Mary Clare Kennedy & Thomas Kerr, Overdose Prevention in the United
States: A Call for Supervised Injection Sites, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 42, 42
(2017).
77
See Cohen, supra note 73.
78
Id.
79
See Beletsky et al., supra note 66, at 231.
80
Id.
81
See Supervised Consumption Services, supra note 71.
82
Alex H. Kral & Peter J. Davidson, Addressing the Nation’s Opioid Epidemic: Lessons from an Unsanctioned Supervised Injection Site in the U.S., 53
AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 919, 919–20 (2017).
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1. SUPERVISED INJECTION SITES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
Australia has one supervised injection site (referred to as a
“medically supervised injecting centre”) that has operated since
2001 in Kings Cross, Sydney.83 As of 2015, this facility has supervised more than 900,000 injections and responded to almost 6000
overdoses—without a single fatality.84 A study of the facility found
that seventy percent of the people who used this service had never
accessed any local health service before, more than 12,000 referrals
were made to health and social welfare services, overdose-related
ambulance calls were reduced by eighty percent, and the local municipality observed a fifty percent reduction in discarded needles.85
Canada’s supervised injection sites began in Vancouver, British
Columbia,86 but are now active in six major cities across the country.87 As in Australia, there have been no fatal overdoses reported at
any site.88 After the first facility opened in 2002, Vancouver has observed a thirty-five percent decrease in the rate of overdoses89 and a
sixty-seven percent decrease in ambulance calls for treating overdoses.90 Furthermore, eighteen percent of users visiting the site began a detoxification program during follow-up appointments.91
Germany has twenty-four supervised injection sites in fifteen
different cities,92 operating since the “3rd Amendment of German

83
Medically Supervised Injecting Centres, ALCOHOL & DRUG FOUND. (Feb.
17, 2017), https://adf.org.au/insights/medically-supervised-injecting-centres/.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
See Evan Wood et al., Attendance at Supervised Injecting Facilities and
Use of Detoxification Services, 354 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 2512, 2512–13
(2006).
87
See Interactive Map: Canada’s Response to the Opioid Crisis, GOV’T
CAN.,
http://health.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-medication/
opioids/responding-canada-opioid-crisis/map.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2020)
(displaying the locations of the forty supervised injection sites across Canada
through an interactive map).
88
Jennifer Ng et al., Does Evidence Support Supervised Injection Sites?, 63
CANADIAN FAM. PHYSICIAN 866, 866 (2017).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
See Wood et al., supra note 86, at 2512–13.
92
DRUG CONSUMPTION ROOMS, supra note 74.
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Narcotics Law” was passed in 2000.93 Between 2001 and 2009, over
3200 drug emergencies were treated, 710 people were saved through
“immediate resuscitation measures,” and an estimated 75,000 drug
users were referred to drug treatment services.94
Luxembourg has two supervised injection sites, with the first
opening in 2005.95 Since their inception, the facilities have supervised more than 56,000 injections96 and managed 1025 overdoses.97
The total number of overdose deaths decreased from twenty-seven
in 2007 to five in 2011.98
The Netherlands established supervised injection sites in 1994
and has thirty-one sites across twenty-five cities.99 While there is no
direct empirical data surrounding these facilities, the Netherlands
has the lowest rate of injection drug users in the European Union,
one of the lowest percentages of HIV transmission, and a drug overdose death rate of 0.5 per 100,000 people.100
Norway has two supervised injection sites in two cities.101 Since
opening in 2005, these supervised injection sites have not had a

93

DEUTSCHE AIDS-HILFE & AKZEPT E.V., DRUG CONSUMPTION ROOMS IN
GERMANY: A SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT BY THE AK KONSUMRAUM 8 (2011),
https://www.akzept.org/pdf/aktuel_pdf/DKR07af1Eng.pdf.
94
See id. at 30.
95
EUROPEAN MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION,
LUXEMBOURG COUNTRY DRUG REPORT 2017,
at 11 (2017),
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/4517/TD0616153ENN.pdf.
96
Id.
97
Luxembourg Overview, INT’L NETWORK DRUG CONSUMPTION ROOMS,
http://www.drugconsumptionroom-international.org/index.php/locations/201509-27-13-37-46/location-luxembourg (last visited Mar. 9, 2020).
98
Id.
99
EUROPEAN MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION,
NETHERLANDS COUNTRY DRUG REPORT 2017, at 12 (2017),
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/4512/TD0616155ENN.pdf.
100
Georgiy Vanunts, “It’s Something Like a Living Room”: My Experience of
a Safe Drug Use Room in Amsterdam, TALKINGDRUGS (Feb. 25, 2017),
https://www.talkingdrugs.org/its-something-like-a-living-room-my-experienceof-safe-drug-use-room-in-amsterdam.
101
THOMAS CLAUSEN, THE ROLE OF THE SAFE INJECTION FACILITY IN OSLO
AND THE OPENING HOURS ON PATTERNS OF AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS FOR
OVERDOSE
2
(2017),
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single reported fatality,102 and between 2015 and 2016, the supervised injection site in Oslo supervised almost 70,000 injections and
prevented 600 overdoses.103
Spain’s first site opened its doors in 2001.104 In its first year,
nearly 2900 injection users visited the site, and doctors prevented
157 overdoses and 113 acute reactions to drug toxicity.105 Spain additionally observed a decrease in HIV infections for its drug users
between 2004 and 2008 from 19.9% to 8.2%, respectively.106
Switzerland established twelve supervised injection sites in
eight cities107 in an attempt to curb the highest HIV rates in Western
Europe.108 In the ten years since the sites opened, the rates of both
HIV infections and overdose mortality rates were reduced by fifty
percent.109 Further, seventy percent of current drug users now receive treatment—one of the highest global rates.110
2. EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES’ UNSANCTIONED
SUPERVISED INJECTION SITE
In September 2014, a social service agency located in an undisclosed urban area in the United States opened an underground, research-based supervised injection site.111 This unsanctioned site collected qualitative data from its clients, and the resulting evaluations
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/attachments/6240/Safe%20consumption%20room%202017%20SIF%20and%20overdose%20Oslo%20%20Thomas%20Clausen%2C%20Norway.pdf.
102
Id. at 5.
103
Id.
104
Andy Malinowski, The Vein in Spain: Viability of Safe Injection Rooms,
DRUGLINK, Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 20, 22.
105
Id.
106
Spain Overview, INT’L NETWORK DRUG CONSUMPTION ROOMS,
http://www.drugconsumptionroom-international.org/index.php/locations/201509-27-13-39-55/location-spain (last visited Mar. 9, 2020).
107
DRUG CONSUMPTION ROOMS, supra note 74.
108
Stephanie Nebehay, Swiss Drug Policy Should Serve as Model: Experts,
REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2010, 1:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swissdrugs/swiss-drug-policy-should-serve-as-model-expertsidUSTRE69O3VI20101025.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Kral & Davidson, supra note 82, at 919.
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were reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board of
the University of California, San Diego.112 The purpose was to test
the criticism directed at proposed supervised injection sites in the
United States: despite the evidence that supervised injection sites
have been unambiguously successful abroad, such programs would
not benefit the public’s health.113
In the first two years, medical personnel supervised 2574 injections.114 Two overdoses occurred, and both were reversed using Naloxone.115 In addition, the following statistics were observed: around
ninety-two percent of participants reported that they would have
otherwise injected in a public restroom, street, park, or parking lot;
sixty-seven percent reported a “very high” rate of unsafe disposal of
used equipment before using the site; and around thirty percent had
experienced or witnessed an overdose outside of this particular
site.116 No fatalities or incidents of violence occurred in the two
years that this supervised injection site was operating and delivering
data.117
III. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO PROPOSED
SUPERVISED INJECTION SITES
The Federal Government is unequivocally opposed to the establishment of any supervised injection site.118 In responding to proposed supervised injection sites in Vermont, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Vermont—without citing any evidence—released the following press statement:
112

Id. at 920.
Janet Burns, Research Finds Signs of Recovery, Solidarity at Underground
Safe
Injection
Site,
FORBES
(Jan.
2,
2018,
10:00
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2018/01/02/research-finds-signs-ofrecovery-community-at-underground-safe-injection-site/#4d4d9bde5d23.
114
See Kral & Davidson, supra note 82, at 920.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 920–21.
117
Id. at 920.
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See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the U.S. Attorney’s Office Concerning Proposed Injection Sites (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-vt/pr/statement-us-attorney-s-office-concerningproposed-injection-sites [hereinafter Statement of the U.S. Attorney’s Office
Concerning Proposed Injection Sites].
113
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SIFs [(Supervised Injection Facilities)] are counterproductive and dangerous as a matter of policy, and
they would violate federal law.
As to policy, the proposed government-sanctioned sites would encourage and normalize heroin
use, thereby increasing demand for opiates and, by
extension, risk of overdose and overdose deaths.
Opiate users, moreover, all-to-often [sic] believe
they are purchasing heroin when, in fact, they are
purchasing its common substitute, fentanyl, ingestion of which gives rise to greatly enhanced dangers
of overdose and fatality. Introduction of fentanyl to
SIFs would create additional public health risks, not
only for the users, but for SIF staff members who
might come in contact with that highly potent substance . . . . Such facilities would also threaten to undercut existing and future prevention initiatives by
sending exactly the wrong message to children in
Vermont: the government will help you use heroin.
Indeed, by encouraging and normalizing heroin injection, SIFs may even encourage individuals to use
opiates for the first time, or to switch their method of
ingestion from snorting to injection, the latter carrying greatly increased risk of fatality and overdose.
Of equal importance, the proposed SIFs would
violate several federal criminal laws, including those
prohibiting use of narcotics and maintaining a premises for the purpose of narcotics use. It is a crime,
not only to use illicit narcotics, but to manage and
maintain sites on which such drugs are used and distributed. Thus, exposure to criminal charges would
arise for users and SIF workers and overseers.119
Rod Rosenstein, the then-acting Deputy Attorney General of the
United States, reiterated this federal opposition to supervised
119

Id.
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injection sites in an opinion article published in the New York Times
on August 27, 2018, titled Fight Drug Abuse, Don’t Subsidize It.120
Rosenstein argued that supervised injection sites are “very dangerous and would only make the opioid crisis worse”—and, further,
that increased federal prosecutions are slowing the “surge in overdose deaths.”121 These sites, according to him, would “normalize
drug use and facilitate addiction,” and Rosenstein called establishing “any location for the purpose of facilitating illicit drug use” illegal,122 and violators should expect “swift and aggressive action” by
the federal government.123 To end the opioid crisis, Rosenstein asserted that the focus of the federal government should be on education, treatment, and prosecution.124
Rosenstein was primarily responding to locally-proposed supervised injection sites in cities such as New York, 125 Philadelphia,126
San Francisco,127 and Seattle.128 After Rosenstein’s article, California’s governor, Jerry Brown, vetoed a supervised injection site bill,
citing his fear of “expos[ing] local officials and health care professionals to potential federal criminal charges.” 129 Other locations,

120

Rosenstein, supra note 12.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
124
Id.
125
See, e.g., William Neuman, De Blasio Moves to Bring Safe Injection Sites
to New York City, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/05/03/nyregion/nyc-safe-injection-sites-heroin.html?smtyp=cur&smid=twnytmetro.
126
See, e.g., Kristen De Groot, This City Wants to Allow Supervised Drug Injection Sites to Combat the Opioid Epidemic, YAHOO! (Jan. 23, 2018),
https://www.yahoo.com/news/city-wants-allow-supervised-drug000038369.html.
127
See, e.g., German Lopez, The Trump Administration’s Threat Against Safe
Injection Sites is Working, VOX (Oct. 2, 2018, 1:00 PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/2/17927864/safe-injectionsite-trump-jerry-brown-california.
128
See, e.g., Seattle Budget Includes Money for Safe-Injection Site, KIRO7,
https://www.kiro7.com/news/local/seattle-budget-includes-money-for-safe-injection/651500019 (last updated Nov. 21, 2017, 9:40 AM).
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See Lopez, supra note 127.
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like Philadelphia, began moving forward with plans to open supervised injection sites, despite explicit federal opposition.130
The federal government responded to this movement on February 5, 2019,131 when U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, William McSwain, filed a civil lawsuit opposing Philadelphia’s supervised injection site.132 McSwain asked a federal judge
to declare supervised injection site operations illegal under federal
law.133 The federal judge disagreed with the United States’ position
and reasoned that the relevant Controlled Substances Act statute
(discussed below)134 was never intended to extend to medical treatment programs that are built for harm reduction purposes. 135
McSwain responded with the statement that “[t]oday’s opinion is
merely the first step in a much longer legal process that will play
out. This case is obviously far from over. We look forward to continuing to litigate it, and we are very confident in our legal position.”136
IV. STATE VERSUS FEDERAL: THE FIGHT OVER SUPERVISED
INJECTION SITES
Putting politics aside, this looming “state versus federal” conflict raises several legal questions that this Note will seek to answer.
(1) Do states have the authority to create supervised injection sites?
(2) If so, does the existing federal law apply to supervised injection
See, e.g., Aubrey Whelan, Here’s How Safehouse, Philly’s Proposed Safeinjection Site, Will Operate, PHILA. INQUIRER (Oct. 8, 2018),
http://www.philly.com/philly/health/addiction/safe-injection-site-philadelphiasafehouse-faq-20181008.html.
131
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 1, United States v. Safehouse, 408
F. Supp. 3d 583 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (No. 19-0519).
132
Larissa Morgan, The Regulatory Battle Over Safe Injection Sites, REG.
REV. (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/10/08/morgan-regulatory-battle-over-safe-injection-sites/.
133
Id.
134
See infra notes 195–200 and accompanying text.
135
Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 614.
136
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Uni ted States Attorney McSwain on Today’s Opinion in the United States v. Safehouse Litigation
(Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/statement-united-states-attorney-mcswain-today-s-opinion-united-states-v-safehouse.
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sites? (3) And, if that is true, should the federal government be able
to successfully prosecute these individuals?
A. State and Local Authority to Create Supervised Injection Sites
There is little question as to whether a state or local municipality
has the authority to create a supervised injection site. This authority
is founded in “police powers,” which historically have granted local
governments the authority to regulate their respective public’s
health, safety, and morals.137 The police power represents the sovereign power afforded to states under the United States’ federal system, and only excludes those areas explicitly surrendered to the federal government under the Constitution.138 Though police powers
are not limitless, courts typically construe them broadly.139 These
powers legitimize state actions to ensure that communities live
safely in environments conducive to proper health and moral standards, as well as promoting broadly-defined social goods.140
In the particular context of public health, police powers include
those laws or regulations aimed at improving relevant populations’
morbidity and mortality rates.141 The police powers allow state and
local governments to pass laws preventing injury and disease,142
promoting vaccinations,143 and regulating sanitation,144 waste disposal,145 and air quality.146 Though the creation of any supervised
injection site arguably runs contrary to federal law, 147 states have
137
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT
92 (rev. 2d ed. 2008).
138
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 11 (1824).
139
E.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941); see Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 485
(2004).
140
See GOSTIN, supra note 137, at 92.
141
Id. at 94.
142
See TOM CHRISTOFFEL & STEPHEN P. TERET, PROTECTING THE PUBLIC:
LEGAL ISSUES IN INJURY PREVENTION 25–29 (1993).
143
See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922).
144
See, e.g., People of City of Lakewood by & on Behalf of People v. Haase,
596 P.2d 392, 394 (Colo. 1979).
145
See, e.g., Singleton v. City of Hamilton, 515 N.E.2d 8, 13 (Ohio Ct. App.
1986).
146
See, e.g., Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm’n, 279 A.2d 388, 392 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1971).
147
See infra notes 190–206 and accompanying text.
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still passed laws that are prohibited under federal law or disfavored
by federal policymakers.148 For instance, many state governments
have passed medical marijuana laws, exempting those qualified users from state criminal prosecution149—though under federal law,
marijuana still remains illegal to possess or consume per the Controlled Substances Act.150 So, while federal authorities have expressed their opinion that supervised injection sites are unlawful as
a matter of federal law, this apparent federal hostility is not enough
to prevent states from establishing supervised injection sites in accordance with their lawful police powers.151 In addition, using state
legislation to create a supervised injection site would eliminate any
uncertainty about such a facility conflicting with state laws or constitutions, and those states would be on the strongest footing to resist
challenges from the federal government.152
A supervised injection site may also be enacted through a local
municipality, as all states delegate some police powers to counties,
cities, or towns to pass laws or ordinances in the name of public
well-being.153 These programs must be supported by reasonable evidence that they will be effective in combatting an existing health
threat.154 A local government could enact an ordinance to create a
supervised injection site, consistent with other public health policy
innovations like needle prescription laws. 155 However, locallypassed ordinances or laws could be subjected to claims that they are

148

See Burris et al., supra note 20, at 1107.
See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct.
16,
2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuanalaws.aspx.
150
21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 844 (2018).
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See Beletsky et al., supra note 66, at 233.
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Burris et al., supra note 20, at 1106–07.
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See, e.g., Ass’n of Home Appliance Manufacturers v. City of New York,
36 F. Supp. 3d 366, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (explaining that while “[p]olice powers
repose with the states, . . . New York State delegates certain of such powers—e.g.,
legislative authority relating to local safety, health and well-being—to its municipalities through the state constitution, the Municipal Home Rule Law and the
General Cities Law”) (citations omitted).
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See Beletsky et al., supra note 66, at 233.
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in conflict with state law and, therefore, preempted.156 To avoid
those potential constitutional problems, states would be better off
establishing a supervised injection site through their state legislature.
B. Prosecuting a Supervised Injection Site
Before the “War on Drugs” began, the federal government’s role
in prosecuting drug crimes was relatively modest.157 However, the
passage of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 empowered the
federal government with almost unlimited jurisdiction158 after Congress rationalized that the trafficking, possession, or use of illegal
drugs “ha[d] a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and
welfare of the American people.”159 Although state governments are
not necessarily obligated to follow federal drug laws,160 the federal
government has mentioned two different theories of prosecution,
which would potentially criminalize the operation and use of supervised injection sites: (1) 21 U.S.C. § 844 (addressing simple possession);161 and (2) 21 U.S.C. § 856 (otherwise known as the “Crack
House Statute”).162 Both of these statutes will be addressed accordingly.
1. SIMPLE POSSESSION
Under § 844, it is “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance.”163 However, under its
theory of prosecution, the federal government would be limited to
prosecuting the injection drug users, not the site workers.164 Unless
supervised injection site employees actually possess, hold, or
See id. (“[T]he attempt in Atlantic City, NJ, to implement an syringe exchange program was successfully challenged in court by the local prosecutor, who
argued that it was prohibited by state drug law.”).
157
Burris et al., supra note 20, at 1113.
158
Id.
159
21 U.S.C. § 801 (2018).
160
See, e.g., State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 149.
161
21 U.S.C. § 844.
162
21 U.S.C. § 856; see also Jacob A. Epstein, Note, Molly and the Crack
House Statute: Vulnerabilities of A Recuperating Music Industry, 23 U. MIAMI
BUS. L. REV. 95, 102–03 (2014).
163
21 U.S.C. § 844.
164
See id.
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control the drugs brought into the facilities, the federal government
should be unable to successfully bring criminal charges against
them.165 Indeed, the supervised injection site patients maintain sole
control and dominion over their drugs while in the facilitates, so at
no time would any health care professional directly handle any of
the drugs.166 The operators of supervised injection sites act, instead,
as health, drug treatment, and safe-injection resources, prepared to
help any overdosing individual.167
The government may be able to assert that these healthcare officials were in “constructive” possession of these substances,168 but
this should be an attenuated and unsuccessful argument. To have
constructive possession over a narcotic, a person must know of its
presence and have the power to exercise dominion and control over
it,169 though if a person has exclusive control over the premise where
the contraband is found, then knowledge and control may be inferred.170 But if no individual has that exclusive control over a supervised injection site, any claim of constructive possession would
be seemingly defeated—“[m]ere proximity to contraband, presence
on property where it is found, and association with a person or persons having control of it are all insufficient to establish constructive
possession.”171 In essence, the government would have to prove that
these operators had the ultimate control over the drugs,172 which any
health official at a given site would likely deny since no supervised
injection employee directly assists with injections.173 The use of
simple possession statutes should thus be limited to the individuals
entering and leaving a supervised injection site.174 However, as Rod
Rosenstein mentioned in his article, the federal government’s best
165

Beletsky et al., supra note 66, at 231.
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Cir. 2016).
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argument against the establishment of these supervised injection
sites is likely through the application of the “Crack House Statute.”175
2. THE “CRACK HOUSE STATUTE”
In 1986, the federal government amended the Controlled Substances Act by adding § 856, which would be known as the “Crack
House Statute.”176 This statute was designed to punish those who
used their property to run drug businesses in the midst of the 1980s
crack epidemic.177 In particular, this statute prohibited the operation
of houses or buildings—such as crack houses—where crack, cocaine, or other drugs are manufactured and used.178 Section (a)(1) of
this statute originally stated that it shall be unlawful to “knowingly
open or maintain any place for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance.”179 Section (a)(2) made
it illegal to do the following:
manage or control any building, room, or enclosure,
either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease,
or make available for use, with or without compensation, the building, room, or enclosure for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.180
This statute, however, was amended in 2003 by further broadening the language to reach “any place,” whether operating “permanently or temporarily.”181 This amendment was originally proposed

175

See Rosenstein, supra note 12 (describing how the federal government
could use the “Crack House Statute” to prosecute the operators of supervised injection sites).
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See Epstein, supra note 162, at 102–03.
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178
Richard Belfiore, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
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Making, Distributing, or Using Controlled Drugs, 21 U.S.C.A. § 856, 116 A.L.R.
Fed. 345 (1993) (detailing the different courts’ interpretations of Section 856).
179
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as the “Reducing Americans’ Vulnerability to Ecstasy”182 Act or the
RAVE Act.183 Though eventually passed as the “Illicit Drug AntiProliferation Act of 2003,” the initial title of the RAVE Act is indicative of the congressional purpose behind amending the “Crack
House Statute,” i.e., directly targeting the producers of dance events,
such as raves, at which drugs like methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA,” colloquially known as “ecstasy”) were often
used.184 This increased federal jurisdiction covered not only those
places where drugs are made or consumed, but also those premises
that make available or profit off illegal drug use on their respective
properties.185
United States v. Chen illustrates how the “Crack House Statute”
has been applied.186 There, the defendant, a motel owner, encouraged his tenants to use, purchase, and sell drugs out of his motel
rooms—so long as the participants continued to pay rent.187 The defendant was ultimately convicted.188 Similarly, in United States v.
Meshack, the defendant ran a bar-b-que shop that operated simultaneously as a location to purchase drugs.189 Like in Chen, the defendant was also convicted.190
In both cases, the Fifth Circuit found that drug distribution was
a significant purpose surrounding the businesses, and the “Crack
House Statute” was lawfully applied.191 Although a supervised injection site will not distribute, encourage, or profit off the consumption of illegal opioids, the federal government may nonetheless argue—as Rod Rosenstein claimed—that the purpose of these sites is
182
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to facilitate drug use, which would potentially bring these sites
within the purview of the federal government’s reach.192
B. Does Section 856 Preempt State Legislation Authorizing a
Supervised Injection Site?
Federal opposition to supervised injection sites asserts that these
facilities fall plainly under subsection (a)(1) of the “Crack House
Statute”193 and that any state law creating a site would therefore be
preempted as explicitly indicated by 21 U.S.C. § 901, which provides the following:
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as
indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any
State law on the same subject matter which would
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless
there is a positive conflict between that provision of
this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.194
As in all preemption cases, congressional purpose is the “ultimate touchstone.”195 When considering preemption, the starting assumption is that the historic police powers of the states are not to be
“superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”196 The explicit purpose of Congress when
crafting the Controlled Substances Act was to preempt those state
192

See Rosenstein, supra note 12.
See Statement of the U.S. Attorney’s Office Concerning Proposed Injection Sites, supra note 118.
194
21 U.S.C. § 903; The power for the federal government to preempt state
law is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which
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to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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laws that “positive[ly] conflict” with its sections, “so that the two
cannot consistently stand together.”197 It is not entirely clear,
though, that the creation of a supervised injection site would positively conflict with § 856.
The language of § 856 seemingly excludes bona fide medical
and scientific interventions involving controlled drugs. 198 The statute generally forbids facilitating or using “any controlled substance,”199 but, as mentioned below, the federal government has not
typically applied this statute to prosecute a facility whose purpose
involves a legitimate medical practice.200 Indeed, courts have found
that § 856 is not implicated when the consumption of drugs is
“merely incidental” to the purpose of maintaining that particular residence.201 The reasoning behind this exception is that the primary
purpose of enacting the “Crack House Statute” was “to punish those
who use their property to run drug businesses—hence, the more
characteristics of a business that are present, the more likely it is that
the property is being used ‘for the purpose of’ those drug activities
prohibited by § 856(a)(1).”202 These supervised injection sites can
therefore be interpreted as falling outside of § 856 because their purpose is to minimize the threat to the public’s health and welfare resulting from unsafe, public injections of illegal opioids—far removed from the targeted drug-profiting establishments.203
For similar reasons, these supervised injection sites are wholly
consistent with the entirety of the Controlled Substances Act. The
Act puts a particular emphasis on establishing long-term federal
strategies that include both effective law enforcement and health
programs, “recogni[zing] that education, treatment, rehabilitation,
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See 21 U.S.C. § 856.
199
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research, training, and law enforcement efforts are interrelated.” 204
As noted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Moore, the Controlled Substances Act is not simply focused on the general use of
drugs, but also “the diversion of drugs from legitimate channels to
illegitimate channels.”205 The act explicitly acknowledges that many
controlled substances may have legitimate medical use and “are necessary to maintain the health and general welfare of the American
people.”206 Thus, if these facilities can be viewed as more than “a
taxpayer-sponsored haven to shoot up,”207 and instead as medical
centers where health care providers are ameliorating general public
health risks, then a supervised injection site should be reasonably
considered to be legitimate medical practice under the Controlled
Substances Act.208
C. The Gonzales Cases and Federal Preemption
Considering the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of a
supervised injection site as a legitimate medical facility, the preemption analysis is not straightforward. The federal government has not,
and likely will not, view any established supervised injection site as
serving a legitimate medical purpose, which puts these state-sponsored facilities and their users in direct conflict with both the “Crack
House Statute” and the Controlled Substances Act.209 However, two
cases exemplify how a court may analyze this potential conflict.
The first case involves a federal official’s authority to unilaterally interpret what constitutes a legitimate medical practice—an issue decided in Gonzales v. Oregon.210 In essence, this case illustrates the extent of federal authority to interpret whether a supervised injection site constitutes a legitimate medical facility and, consequently, whether its establishment falls under federal jurisdiction.211
204
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In 1994, Oregon voters enacted the Oregon Death With Dignity
Act (“ODWDA”), which allowed physician-assisted suicide for patients with incurable, irreversible diseases that would otherwise die
within six months.212 Under the law, the administering physician is
required to follow particular medical procedures, keep records, and
be registered both with the state Board of Medical Examiners and
the federal Drug Enforcement Administration.213 The doctor may
only dispense the prescription, but may not administer it.214 However, on November 9, 2001, the acting attorney general issued an
Interpretive Rule that determined that using substances to assist in
suicide is not a legitimate medical practice; therefore, any doctor
who dispenses or prescribes these drugs is arguably acting unlawfully under the Controlled Substances Act.215 Several plaintiffs challenged this Interpretive Rule, as it would substantially disrupt the
ODWDA regime.216
The Supreme Court answered the question of whether the attorney general, or any other executive official, had the authority to independently interpret federal law.217 The Court explained in Gonzales v. Oregon that the Controlled Substances Act does not manifest
an intent to “regulate the practice of medicine generally.”218 Instead,
Congress regulated medical practice insofar as trafficking or dealing
illegal drugs.219 The Act’s silence in defining exactly what constitutes a legitimate medical practice, according to the Court, is “understandable given the structure and limitations of federalism, which
allow the States ‘great latitude under their police powers to legislate
as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of
all persons.’”220 Without an explicit statute to say otherwise or give
proper definitions congruent with the Interpretive Rule, the Supreme
Court explained, the Attorney General was not authorized to bar
212
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dispensing controlled substances for assisted suicides in the face of
a state medical regime permitting such conduct.221
When comparing the analysis of Gonzales v. Oregon to the creation of supervised injection sites, apparent differences emerge because of the existence of the “Crack House Statute.” Since the Controlled Substances Act was silent on the legality of physician-assisted suicides, the Court agreed that the State of Oregon, not the
Attorney General, was authorized to define whether that action constituted legitimate medical practice.222 This differs from the “Crack
House Statute,” which expressly opposes any place that operates for
the purposes of using illegal drugs.223 Therefore, the challenge to
state-sanctioned supervised injection sites would more closely parallel Gonzales v. Raich, a case involving a conflict between the Controlled Substances Act and an enacted medical marijuana law in California.224
D. Gonzales v. Raich and the Federal Government’s Overreach to
Supervised Injection Sites
Like a federal challenge to supervised injection sites, the situation presented in Gonzales v. Raich did not have clear-cut supremacy clause preemption, even in the face of apparently conflicting
federal and state laws.225 In 1996, California passed a state law that
allowed physicians to prescribe medical marijuana to patients and
primary caregivers without fear of state prosecution.226 The law also
protected the patients and caregivers from local prosecution for either possession or cultivation of marijuana, so long as their prescription had been lawfully approved.227 After a federal raid into one of
the respondents’ homes, which destroyed several marijuana plants,
an action was brought against the Attorney General and DEA seeking injunctive relief from the enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act.228 The State of California challenged the Controlled
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
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Substances Act’s categorical prohibition on the manufacture and
possession of marijuana, arguing that this prohibition exceeded
Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.229
This Congressional authority is derived from Article I of the
United States Constitution, which states that “Congress shall have
Power To . . . regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”230
In essence, a portion of the congressional authority has been defined
as the power to regulate activities that affect interstate commerce.231
The Commerce Clause’s authority, however, is not unlimited. In
seeking to preserve a system of dual sovereignty—where Congress’s powers are restricted to those enumerated in the Constitution—local economic activity must “substantially affect interstate
commerce,” or the relevant federal law gives way to state legislation.232 To illustrate, the Supreme Court has struck down federal
criminal laws purporting to regulate interstate commerce that, in
fact, encroached on state police power—central to those decisions
was that both statutes were noneconomic in nature.233 The Court
worried that “[w]ere the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state control—areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities—the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would
blur.”234
In analyzing whether Congress overstepped its authority under
the Commerce Clause, the Raich Court ruled against California,
holding that the conflicting portions of the Controlled Substances
Act were a valid exercise of the federal government’s Commerce
Clause power.235 Unlike those statutes in the above-mentioned
Commerce Clause cases, the activities regulated by the Controlled
Substances Act are “quintessentially economic.”236 The California
229
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statute in question permitted both possession and cultivation of an
illegal drug, and when those local activities were aggregated across
the entire state, the Court found little question of its economic effect
on interstate commerce, therefore holding that the federal law governed.237
Importantly for the argument to establish a supervised injection
site, however, the Court analyzed Gonzales v. Raich in terms of
“whether Congress’ power to regulate interstate markets for medicinal substances encompasses the portions of those markets that are
supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally”238—as opposed to a supervised injection site, which would not legalize, encourage, or otherwise authorize the cultivation of opioids.239 Scholarly writing about supervised injection has pointed to this holding in
Gonzales v. Raich as being detrimental to the programs’ lawful establishment, with the assumption that these supervised injection
sites will have a parallel impact on interstate commerce.240 Yet, this
simplistic assumption ignores all empirical data known about supervised injection sites, which, according to a collection of modern research, do not increase drug use in surrounding areas.241 Without
any effect on the usage of opioids in cities that have established supervised injection sites, there can be no rational link to the interstate
supply or demand of that specific illegal commodity. Therefore, to
say that utilizing supervised injection sites is “economic” in the
same way that the legalization of a controlled substance for a medical purpose is considered “economic” defies rational, evidencebased thought.
Indeed, supervised injection sites will not decriminalize possession or encourage cultivation of injection-based opioids, but instead
237
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will allow those already obtained to be safely injected in a sanitary
location.242 The differences between the circumstances in the Raich
case compared to any challenges to a supervised injection site are
apparent. Whereas the Raich Court could rationally speculate an effect on interstate commerce for a law that authorizes the production
of a controlled substance, supervised injection sites simply are
mechanisms to protect vulnerable populations from the harmful effects of injection-based opioids. Further, the above-mentioned research on supervised injection sites refutes any notion that these
sites will cause illegal markets for injection-based opioids to grow.
Without any empirical evidence to the contrary, the federal government’s use of the “Crack House Statute” to prosecute future supervised injection sites would be infringing on the type of local, noneconomic activity that the Supreme Court has explicitly allocated to
the states. Supervised injection sites should not be federally
preempted, and states will likely be successful in defending against
inevitable federal prosecution.
CONCLUSION
While states like California have been quick to ‘bend the knee’
to federal threats regarding supervised injection sites,243 the federal
government’s grounds for prosecution are weak. Even so, on January 15, 2020, Surgeon General Jerome Adams reiterated the government’s opposition to these sites, stating that he has “seen little to no
data suggesting they are overall more effective than expanding syringe services programs.”244 Hopefully, states will continue to push
for the creation of supervised injection sites to sensibly reduce
harms associated with unsafe, public injection of opioids. Although
it is impossible to know whether the presence of a supervised injection site may have saved someone like Blake Hadden and allowed
him to walk across the stage at Furman University, the empirical
242

See Supervised Consumption Services, supra note 71.
See Lopez, supra note 127.
244
Kimberly Leonard, Trump Surgeon General Criticizes Supervised Injection Sites as Opioid Crisis Response, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 15, 2020, 1:53 PM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/healthcare/trump-surgeon-general-criticizes-supervised-injection-sites-as-opioid-crisis-response.
243

1178

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1145

evidence is promising that these sites will begin to reverse some of
the detrimental effects from the opioid crisis and give some people—who would otherwise overdose—another day to live.245
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See Potier et al., supra note 241, at 50–62.

